On Nov 14, 2018, UK Supreme Court in a landmark judgment in Warner-Lambert v Generics (UK) (Mylan)
case found Lyrica® pain patent invalid & not infringed by generic filers.
This appeal to UKSC raises the question of how the concepts
of
sufficiency and
infringement are to be applied
to a “Swiss-form patent” relating to a specified medical use of a known
pharmaceutical compound. Herein below providing the summary given by court in
understanding the decision. The full judgment of the Court is available at:
http://supremecourt.uk/decided-cases/index.html.
The Appellant (“Warner-Lambert”/ Pfizer) is the proprietor
of European Patent No. 0641330 for Isobutylgaba. This is used for the treatment
of seizure disorders, including epilepsy. Pregabalin, a derivative compound of
Isobutylgaba, is marketed by Warner-Lambert under the “Lyrica®” brand. Patent No. 0641330 expired on 17 May 2013. This
appeal concerns a second European Patent No. EP(UK) 0934061 entitled “Isobutylgaba and its derivatives for
the treatment of pain”. The claims of the Patent (which define the scope of
the patent protection) are all purpose limited. Most relevant are Claims 1-3 on
the use of pregabalin for treating (1) pain, (2) inflammatory pain and (3)
neuropathic pain. Lyrica has marketing authorisation in the EU for treatment of
peripheral and central neuropathic pain, epilepsy and generalised anxiety
disorder. It is one of Pfizer’s most successful drugs in the UK. The First
Respondent (“Mylan”) and the Second Respondent, Actavis Group PTC EHF
(“Actavis”), are pharmaceutical companies mainly engaged in marketing generic
pharmaceutical products.
Actavis markets a generic pregabalin product under the
brand name “Lecaent”, launched in 2015. In these proceedings, Mylan and Actavis
claimed the revocation of the Patent on the grounds of lack of inventive
step and insufficiency. Warner-Lambert claims that Actavis infringes Claims
1 and 3 above.
At first instance, Arnold J rejected the arguments based on
lack of inventive step. These are no longer in issue. Further, he held that
Claim 1 (pain) and Claim 3 (neuropathic pain) were invalid because he construed
Claim 1 as extending to all pain and Claim 3 as extending to all neuropathic
pain. He found that there was sufficient disclosure in the specification to
support the claim that pregabalin was efficacious in the treatment of
inflammatory and peripheral neuropathic pain, but not central neuropathic pain.
Both claims therefore failed for insufficiency. The result of the
judge’s decision was to remove patent protection for the manufacture of
pregabalin for the treatment of both peripheral and central neuropathic pain.
Arnold J also rejected as an abuse of process an application concerning an
amendment to narrow the Patent.
The Court of Appeal (Floyd, Kitchin and Patten LJJ) upheld
the judge’s findings, and his decision on the amendment application. The judge
and Court of Appeal differed in their approach to infringement in patent
cases confined to manufacture for a particular use.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Warner-Lambert contended
that all the claims of the Patent were valid. Their main aim is to establish
the validity of their claims relating to neuropathic pain or, at least,
peripheral neuropathic pain. Actavis and Mylan cross-appealed, arguing that
none of the claims as to neuropathic pain are valid. They only accept as valid
the claims limited to inflammatory pain, for which there is no marketing authorization.
This gives rise to four issues on appeal: (i) the construction of the claims
(in particular, Claim 3 as to neuropathic pain); (ii) amendment and abuse of
process; (iii) the sufficiency of the disclosure in the specification; and (iv)
the test for infringement of a patent in relation to manufacturing for a
limited use.
The Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed issues i & ii: (1) the view of both courts that
Claim 1 extends to all pain and Claim 3 to all neuropathic pain, whether
peripheral or central, and (2) Arnold J’s decision rejecting Warner-Lambert’s
application to amend the Patent to narrow it.
Issue (iii) –
Sufficiency of disclosure in specification for Claims 1 and 3:
The court holds, by a majority that the disclosure in the specification
supports the claims in relation to inflammatory pain, but not neuropathic pain,
whether peripheral or central. Claims 1 and 3 therefore fail for
insufficiency. Thus, the appeal is dismissed and the cross-appeal allowed. The
majority’s approach requires the patentee to demonstrate that the specification
discloses some scientific reason why the implied assertion of efficacy in the
patent claim may well be true. More than a bare assertion or mere
possibility of therapeutic efficiency is required, though a priori reasoning
(not necessarily only experimental data) may suffice. This respects the
principle that the patentee cannot claim a monopoly of new use for an existing
compound without real disclosure. Lord Hodge (dissenting) proposes an
alternative approach to sufficiency, preferring a lower standard of
plausibility, and would have dismissed the cross-appeal. Lord Mance agrees with
Lord Hodge on this issue, concluding that the majority’s approach imposes too high
a threshold.
Issue (iv) – Correct
test for infringement of patent manufactured for a limited use:
The court unanimously holds that if Claims 1 and 3 had been
valid, they would not have been infringed by Actavis. The reasons for arriving
at this agreed result differ substantially. Lord Sumption and Lord Reed
consider that the intention of the alleged infringer, whether subjective or
objective, is irrelevant and that the sole criterion of infringement is
whether the product as it emerges from the manufacturing process, including any
labelling or accompanying leaflet, is presented as suitable for the uses which
enjoy patent protection – the “outward
presentation” test. On the facts of this case, it is not disputed that “Lecaent”
was sold with labels and patient information to the effect that it was for the
treatment of seizure disorders and general anxiety disorder. Lord Mance agrees
that the test depends on the objective appearance and characteristics of the
product as it is prepared, presented and put on the market, but considers that
in rare cases the context may make it obvious that these are not to be taken at
face value. Lord Briggs and Lord Hodge prefer the view of Arnold J that the
test is whether the alleged infringer subjectively intended to target the
patent-protected market (Arnold J found they had not so intended).