Sunday, April 28, 2019

Pemetrexed - USA


On Apr 26, 2019, Federal Circuit affirmed PTAB’s decision that claims of method of use patent are not obvious.

Neptune Generics, LLC, Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC, and Mylan Laboratories Ltd. (“Petitioners”) appealed the PTAB’s decisions regarding U.S. Patent No. 7,772,209. The ’209 patent is owned by Eli Lilly & Co. and relates to administering folic acid and a methylmalonic acid (“MMA”) lowering agent, such as vitamin B12, before administering pemetrexed disodium to reduce toxic effects of pemetrexed therapy. The Board concluded that the claims were not established to be unpatentable for obviousness. It found that it was known in the prior art that pretreatment with folic acid reduces the toxicity associated with administration of an antifolate, like pemetrexed, but there was not a reason to pretreat with vitamin B12 along with folic acid before administering pemetrexed to treat cancer. It also found that the skepticism of others, particularly the FDA, supported a conclusion of nonobviousness.

Federal Circuit while agreeing said that Board’s findings are based on the prior art’s disclosure of the relationships between various biochemicals and toxicity. Deficiencies in both vitamin B12 and folate can lead to elevated levels of the biomarker homocysteine. In contrast, it found that elevated levels of MMA are correlated only with vitamin B12 deficiencies and not folate deficiencies. Therefore, in patients with a vitamin B12 deficiency, but not a folate deficiency, both MMA levels and homocysteine levels would be elevated, while in patients with just a folate deficiency homocysteine levels would be elevated, but MMA levels would not be elevated. The Board further found that while elevated levels of homocysteine were known to be predictive of pemetrexed toxicity, elevated levels of MMA were understood to not be a predictor of pemetrexed toxicity. Board credited the testimony of Lilly’s expert Dr. Bruce Chabner that a skilled artisan would have understood that there was no observed correlation between vitamin B12 deficiency and pemetrexed-induced toxicity. Federal Circuit said that each step of the Board’s analysis is supported by substantial evidence.

Petitioners argued that one of the prior art, EP’005 teaches the administration of folic acid and vitamin B12 to lower homocysteine levels for all purposes. Therefore, a skilled artisan would have been motivated to pretreat with vitamin B12. But Board correctly found that EP’005 is concerned with the cardiovascular effects associated with elevated homocysteine levels, does not discuss antifolates generally. While EP’005 also states that methotrexate, an antifolate drug like pemetrexed, “induce[s] elevated homocysteine levels,” the Board noted that, in contrast, Niyikiza II explained that pemetrexed specifically did not increase homocysteine levels.

With respect to scepticism, Federal Circuit said that evidence of skepticism of others, particularly the FDA, supported a conclusion of nonobviousness. During Lilly’s clinical trials for pemetrexed, a number of fatalities occurred. In response, Lilly recommended supplementation with folic acid and vitamin B12. The FDA responded that the “medical officer does not support adding vitamins to the ongoing . . . trial & “the addition of vitamins . . . is risky.” Despite the FDA’s concerns, it allowed the trial to continue. Therefore, the Board did not err in finding that skepticism supported a conclusion of nonobviousness.

Federal Circuit finally held that Petitioners’ remaining arguments are unpersuasive & thus affirmed Board’s finding of nonobviousness.

Saturday, April 27, 2019

Sorafenib / Rivaroxaban - India


On Apr 22, 2019 The Delhi High Court allowed two Indian drug companies to export drugs for the purposes of development and clinical trials for regulatory clearances under Bolar provision.

Natco & Alembic applied for permission to export, Sorafenib & Rivaroxaban respectively for development of drug for regulatory purposes. Bayer, opposed & said in its writ petition, that if permission were granted to Natco/Alembic, it would be contrary to Section 107A and that such a transaction would be a commercial sale and hence, a patent infringement.

Section 107A of Indian Patent Act (Bolar provision) is:

“For the purposes of this Act,—
(a) any act of making, constructing, using, selling or importing a patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information required under any law for the time being in force, in India, or in a country other than India, that regulates the manufacture, construction, use, sale or import of any product;
(b) importation of patented products by any person from a person who is duly authorised under the law to produce and sell or distribute the product, shall not be considered as a infringement of patent rights.”

The central question of dispute was whether “export” of pharmaceutical drug for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information to regulatory purpose falls under Section 107A (Bolar provision) or not?

Bayer contended that Section 107A was not applicable, because Natco/Alembic was not conducting research. The sale of drug, therefore, amounted to infringement of its patent. Bayer’s interpretation of Section107A was that the provision mentions the word “sale” and also “import”, but the legislature consciously excluded the term “export”. Bayer further argued that Section 48 of the Act implicitly defines infringement by listing the exclusive rights of the patentee. Section 107A of the Act describes a particular set of circumstances in which acts that are largely those named in Section 48 would “not constitute infringement”. Therefore, it is clearly a proviso/exception. Thus the Section 107A constitutes an exception to Section 48 and does not confer a right.

Bayer next argued that the legislative intent behind Section 107A of the Act is only to ensure the availability of a competitor's product immediately after the expiry of patent in the Indian market without having to wait for regulatory approval post patent expiry. However, this intent does not extend to ensuring the availability of the same in other countries or for export purpose. Bayer further argued that the expression "exports” occurs in various other provisions of the Act such as in Sections 84, 90(1) and 92A. They prescribe restrictions and export of a patented product may be allowed only within the ambit of such restrictions. All these show that the legislature has consciously used the expression "export" whenever it was necessary. However, no such explicit mention of export or corresponding restriction as found in these provisions can be seen in Section 107A of the Act.

Bayer next argued that the word “selling” does not include exports, because firstly the Act is territorial in nature and explicitly states in Section 1 that it "extends to the whole of India". Next, the nature and purpose of the Act is primarily to safeguard the interests of the patentee and the nature and purpose of Section 107A of the Act is an exception to the patentee's rights so that the generic versions of the drug may be made available immediately upon expiry of the patent in the Indian market. Thus, making, constructing and using of the product are permitted in India alone and export for that purpose is not contemplated.

Bayer lastly argued that in any event, the learned single judge failed to even consider the quantities sought to be exported by the respondent. They have to be compared with the quantities that are required by the regulatory regime to which information is to be submitted. This is crucial in confirming the purpose for which the non-patentee is undertaking the export. For instance, in the present case, more than 90 kgs of the patented product has been exported by the respondent. Non-consideration of the same runs contrary to the requirements of Section 107A of the Act.

Court’s analysis:

Court said that two clear strands of reasoning have prevailed in various judgments of the Supreme Court, while interpreting the meaning and purport of general words. One, that plain and natural meaning should be preferred ordinarily, and two, that the context and purpose of the provision should always be kept in mind. Given these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that “exports” is used in different contexts in Sections 84, 90 and 92A. Having regard to this, it cannot be held that the Parliament intended to per se exclude “exports” from the sweep and width of the term “sale” in Section 107A.

With respect to the proviso/exception clause court held that Section 107A is not made subject to the other provisions of the Act – on the other hand, Section 48, which talks of the rights of a patent holder is subject to other provisions of the Act that includes Section 107A. Furthermore, Bayer‟s argument that Section 107A constitutes an exception, cannot be accepted. It is an independent provision with a specific history behind it and was subject to intensive Parliamentary debate and scrutiny by a Joint Committee report. Bayer‟s argument that Section 107A has to be read as subordinate to the main provision of Section 48 has to, therefore, fail.

With respect to the question of territoriality, court said that once it is held that patented inventions can be sold for the purpose of carrying on research which fulfils the regulatory requirements of India, there cannot be any bar or an interpretation narrowing the scope of such sale. What is important is the purpose of the sale i.e. objective of carrying on experiment, research and developing information. Moreover, it is plausible- even reasonable- that many nations may require experimentation or research to be carried on in their soil nationally so as to be able to supervise the process and then oversee the outcome. It is, therefore, not possible to dictate the behaviour and legal requirements of other nations by confining the research exception within the territory of India.

Court further said that it is clear, therefore, that neither the quantity used nor the place of research and development or information (i.e. within the country granting patent or on foreign soil) is per se conclusive that the claim to use the Bolar or research exception has to be rejected. Instead, the conduct or action of the individual or entity making, using, constructing or selling the patented product or invention and the purpose for which it sought to be used (i.e. end use and that it should not be commercial) would be important and decisive whether the exporting or purchasing entity intends to use the patented product for commercial purposes.

Thus keeping in view of the above court provided some pointers to decide whether the export is for research/experimental purpose or for commercial purpose. These are:

ü  The patent granted;
ü  The nature of the product sought to be exported;
ü  The details of the party or party importing the product,
ü  The quantity sought to be exported;
ü  Other particulars with respect to the end use of the product, to establish that it is solely for research and development purpose;
ü  All particulars regarding the relevant regulations, covering the kind and scope of inquiry, including the quantities of the product. These details must be supplied by the exporter/seller of the product to the overseas buyer;
ü  If the regulations are in the language of that country, an authentic English translation to facilitate a speedy resolution;
ü  Appropriate interim order, including undertaking by way of affidavit to compensate the plaintiff, in the event the suit was to be decreed and the extent of such monetary compensation;
ü  If necessary, verification through the Indian mission (and its trade division) abroad regarding the authentication of the third party and/ or its facilities abroad;
ü  If it is held by the court that the exporter is not involved in sale or export of any patented product, but a generic article, unprotected by patent law, when denying relief, suitable restitutionary relief should be awarded to the defendants in monetary terms, to preclude litigation that prevents trade or competition.

The above aspects are only indicative of the matters that need examination, they are in no way exhaustive and the court may consider any other matter relevant to the subject.

Saturday, April 20, 2019

Weekly Patent Litigation Roundup


U.S. Supreme Court declines to hear Mohawk drug patent case

HOGANSBURG — The U.S. Supreme Court declined Monday to hear a case over a now-invalidated patent held by the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe for the best-selling dry eye drug Restasis. The drug’s developer, Allergan Inc., announced in September 2017 it had transferred its patents on Restasis to the tribe to protect the drug from a patent dispute. Under the deal, Allergan agreed to pay the tribe $13.75 million. In exchange, the tribe claimed sovereign immunity as grounds to dismiss a patent challenge through a unit of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The agreement called for the tribe to lease the patents back to Allergan, and receive $15 million in annual royalties as long as they are valid…


United Therapeutics Fires Back After Sandoz Files Anti-Competitive Lawsuit Over PAH Drug

United Therapeutics is taking on accusations that it is unfairly blocking competitors from launching generic versions of the company’s top-selling pulmonary arterial hypertension (PAH) drug, Remodulin. Sandoz filed a lawsuit that claimed Maryland-based United Therapeutics and Smiths Medical ASD conspired to block the Novartis subsidiary from launching a generic product. After the lawsuit was filed in federal district court in New Jersey, United Therapeutics called the legal claims made “meritless.” In a statement released earlier this week, United Therapeutics said the lawsuit stems from Sandoz’s own failure to bring its generic version to market, despite having eight years to do so. The lawsuit filed by Sandoz and its development partner RareGen claim that United Therapeutics and Smiths have stymied attempts for its generic of Remodulin (treprostinil) from gaining hold in pharmacies across the country. Less than a month ago, Sandoz launched its generic treprostinil in the United States. In the lawsuit, Sandoz claimed in the lawsuit that United “placed artificial restrictions on Smiths’ cartridges to ensure they can only be used to administer injections of the brand-name treprostinil drug supplied by United Therapeutics….”


Discovery Rulings in Abbvie v. BI Adalimumab Litigation

In an opinion issued on April 11, 2019, the court granted BI’s motion to compel production of pre-litigation “patent dance” disclosures from the AbbVie v. Amgen suit, and settlement agreements between AbbVie and other biosimilar applicants.  The AbbVie v. Amgen litigation involved seven of the eight patents asserted against BI. During the litigation, Amgen and Abbvie engaged in disclosures pursuant to BPCIA including Amgen producing confidential information about its proposed biosimilar under § 262 (l)(1)(B)(i), (l)(2), and disclosures regarding the parties invalidity and infringement assertions (“3B” and “3C” disclosures).  Amgen and AbbVie later settled…


Court Confirms "Unique" Pleading Requirements In Hatch-Waxman Actions

In a March 31, 2019 opinion in Belcher Pharmaceuticals LLC v. International Mediation Systems, Limited, Judge Stark of the Delaware District Court held that complaints in Hatch-Waxman actions can satisfy the requirements imposed by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “as applied to the unique context of a Hatch-Waxman claim for patent infringement.” C.A. No. 19-960-LPS-CJB, D.I. 30 at 9 (D. Del.). There, the defendant filed an application under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2), often called a “paper NDA,” and sent a Paragraph IV Notice to plaintiff.[1] The parties subsequently negotiated an offer of confidential access, and the defendant provided its entire 4,000 page NDA to plaintiff about three weeks prior to the 45-day deadline for filing suit…


European Parliament approves SPC manufacturing waiver

The European Parliament has voted to approve the supplementary protection certificate (SPC) manufacturing waiver, which will allow the stockpiling of generic versions of patented drugs. SPCs extend exclusivity on a drug after the expiration of its patent, for a period of up to five years. Under the proposed waiver, however, EU-based companies will be make generics and biosimilars of patent-protected drugs during the last two years of their SPC-protected drugs, as long as they are intended for export to a market outside of the EU. Companies will also be able to stockpile generics and biosimilars during the last six months of an SPC’s protection period ahead of entry onto the EU market…


Stada launches generic Exforge following patent revocation

German generics producer Stada Arzneimittel announced on 20 March 2019 that it is set to launch a generic version of the antihypertensive Exforge (amlodipine/valsartan combination), following the revocation of a Novartis European patent. This will be Stada’s second attempt at launching the generic combination product. Following the initial launch, Stada and its subsidiaries were forced to withdraw the product from the market one year later in December 2017 as Novartis had obtained an interim injunction before the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court for patent litigation, confirming the Exforge patent until July 2019. However, on 11 March 2019, Novartis’s European patent was revoked following a successful opposition filing by Stada and its subsidiaries, who claimed that the patent, which had previously been upheld by the Objection Division of the European Patent Office, would not stand in an appeal before the Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office…
http://gabionline.net/Generics/News/Stada-launches-generic-Exforge-following-patent-revocation

Friday, April 19, 2019

Job Update

................................................................................

Function: IPR-Formulation

Company: Aurobindo

Location: Hyderabad

Experience: 4-7 years

Qualification: M pharmacy/pharmaceutics

Contact info: Pallavi.Gottumukkala@Aurobindo.com

....................................................................................

If you know or have any vacancy in your IP department then you can contact me at: 
mahen_gunjal@yahoo.co.in 
WhatsApp: +91-7774007489

Thursday, April 18, 2019

Oxycodone - USA

On Apr 17, 2019 Federal Circuit affirmed PTAB’s decision that claims of oxycodone formulation patent with gelling agent are obvious over certain prior arts.

Purdue appealed from the decisions of the PTAB in IPRs, IPR2016-01412 and IPR2016-01413. The Board found claims 1–13 and 16–19 of U.S. Patent No. 9,034,376 unpatentable as obvious. The ’376 patent, entitled “Pharmaceutical Formulation Containing Gelling Agent,” is directed to abuse-deterrent, extended release formulations of oxycodone. The ’376 patent contemplates using two gelling agents, polyethylene oxide (“PEO”) and hydroxypropylmethylcellulose (“HPMC”) in an oxycodone formulation. When the oxycodone formulation is exposed to an aqueous liquid, those gelling agents impart a viscosity to the formulation that makes it unsuitable for parenteral and nasal administration.

Prior to reaching the merits in both proceedings, the Board addressed Joshi’s status as prior art. Amneal (Petitioner) contended that Purdue was collaterally estopped from relitigating Joshi’s availability as prior art based on the final judgment in a district court case regarding U.S. Patent No. 8,337,888, which derived from the same provisional application as the ’376 patent. The Board held that Purdue was collaterally estopped from challenging Joshi’s status as prior art. The Board recognized that Purdue has never previously argued that Joshi (filed on Aug 30, 2001 which claims priority to Apr 30, 2001) did not qualify as prior art. The Board further held that, even if collateral estoppel did not apply to the issue of Joshi’s priority, Joshi qualifies as prior art under section 102(e) because Purdue failed to satisfy its burden of production to show that the ’376 patent is entitled to a filing date earlier than August 6, 2002. Because the claims of the ’376 patent do not have written description support in either the ’534 provisional or a draft of the patent application dated April 25, 2001.
On appeal, Purdue challenged the Board’s conclusion that Joshi qualifies as prior art. Purdue contended that the Board improperly invoked collateral estoppel, and that the claims of the ’376 patent do not have written description support in the ’534 provisional application. Purdue also challenged the Board’s conclusion that claims 1–13 and 16–19 of the ’376 patent are unpatentable as obvious. It argued that a person of ordinary skill would have lacked motivation to combine HPMC and PEO in an abuse-deterrent, extended release oxycodone formulation, and would have lacked a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.

Purdue challenged the Board’s invocation of collateral estoppel on two grounds: that the issue of Joshi’s priority was not actually litigated in the district court case involving the ’888 patent, and that the priority issues regarding the ’888 patent are not identical to the priority issues for the ’376 patent. Federal Circuit agreed with Purdue & held that Joshi’s priority was not actually litigated in the district court case involving the ’888 patent, and therefore do not address whether the priority issues regarding the ’888 patent are identical to the priority issues for the ’376 patent. Federal Circuit further said that Board's collateral estoppel ruling on the notion that “collateral estoppel applies to ‘issues that were or could have been raised’ in the prior litigation, however conflates the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Federal Circuit further said that there is no support for the proposition that failing to distinguish between a provisional and non-provisional application, without more, indicates that Joshi’s priority date was actually litigated. Nor does the fact that Joshi’s priority date might have been a potentially important question in the earlier litigation mean that it was actually litigated. The priority date for the Joshi reference therefore cannot be determined based on collateral estoppel.

With respect to the priority to ’534 application, Federal Circuit said that in the ’534 application disclosure, PEO and HPMC are merely two of many undifferentiated compounds that fall within the genus of gelling agents. Such “laundry list” disclosures do not provide adequate specificity to constitute written description support for Purdue’s claim of priority. To be sure, the language “mixtures thereof” suggests the possibility of combining two or more of the listed gelling agents. Without more, however, that language fails to highlight any preference for how many and which gelling agents to combine. Federal Circuit held that the additional references to PEO and HPMC throughout the provisional application do not constitute “blaze marks” that indicate or direct that a particular combination should be made “rather than any of the many others which could also be made. Accordingly, the court found that substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that the claims of the ’376 patent do not have written description support in the ’534 provisional application. Therefore, Joshi qualifies as prior art under 35 USC 102(e).

With respect to the obviousness, Federal Circuit found Purdue’s each argument unconvincing. Federal Circuit sided with PTAB which held that prior arts teach the claimed invention. Specifically, Royce teaches a sustained release formulation that includes both PEO and HPMC. Royce also suggests that sustained release dosage formulations may be used for analgesics, a category of drug that includes oxycodone. McGinity teaches controlled release dosage forms of analgesics. Hoffmeister and Joshi teach that HPMC and PEO are gelling agents that may be used in an abuse-deterrent formulation. And the PDR teaches extended release oxycodone formulations in doses of 10 mg, 20 mg, 40 mg, and 80 mg. Person skilled in the art thus would have been motivated to use HPMC & PEO with reasonable expectation of success.

Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Board’s determination that claims 1–13 and 16–19 of the ’376 patent are unpatentable for obviousness.

Tuesday, April 16, 2019

Everolimus - USA

On Apr 11, 2019 Delaware court granted Novartis' motion for estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) & prevented Par from pursuing an invalidity defense under§ 103 on claims 1-3 and 8-10.

Background:

Novartis Pharmaceuticals (Plaintiff) filed suit against Par/ Breckenridge (Defendants) for U.S. Patent No. 5,665,772 (03/09/2020 with PED). US’772 patent claims compound & method of use of same. Before trial, Par conceded that their proposed products meet all limitations of the '772 patent. At trial, Defendants challenged the validity of claims 1-3, 7, and 10 of the '772 patent on obviousness grounds, citing twenty-seven pieces of prior art. While litigation was pending, Par challenged claims 1-3 and 8-10 of the '772 patent in an IPR proceeding (IPR2016-00084). The PTAB instituted the IPR on April 29, 2016. On March 28, 2017, Delaware court issued an opinion, determining that the asserted claims of the '772 patent were invalid for obviousness-type double patenting. Court did not address Par’s obviousness defenses or counterclaims. On January 11, 2018, while the appeal was pending on the obviousness-type double patenting decision, the PTAB issued a final written decision in IPR upholding the patentability of claims 1-3 and 8-10 of the ' 772 patent. The Federal Circuit on Dec 7, 2018 later reversed the obviousness-type double patenting decision. When it remanded case back to the Delaware court, Novartis raised the possibility that 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) would estop Par's obviousness defenses and counterclaims based upon the final written decision of the IPR. Defendants raised several objections to the application of IPR estoppel. Defendants also raised an objection to the application of IPR estoppel after the district court has held trial.

Analysis:

35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) provides:

The petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results in a final written decision under section 318(a) ... may not assert in either a civil action arising in whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28 ... that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter parties review.

Court said that the plain language of the statute does not indicate that Congress intended for there to be a time limitation upon the estoppel effect of a final written decision of an IPR. 35 USC 315(e)(2) is directed at claims or defenses that could be raised in a judicial proceeding and not the proceeding itself. Therefore, § 315(e)(2) uses the term "assert," which does not indicate a time limitation. Thus, the plain language of the statute, along with the previously discussed policy objectives of judicial economy, indicates that IPR estoppel will still apply post-trial where the Court has not entered a final judgment on the relevant ground.

Now the question is whether estoppel should apply to the twenty-seven references put forward by Defendants at trial. Plaintiff argued that the twenty-seven trial references all "could reasonably have been raised" in the IPR proceeding because they were used in the September 2016 trial which occurred before the reply due date in the IPR. Court held that given their use at trial, it is apparent that a diligent search would have revealed these references and therefore they "could have been raised" at the IPR proceeding. Thus, Defendants are precluded from pursuing a § 103 invalidity argument as to the ' 772 patent claims 1-3 and 8-10.

Sunday, April 14, 2019

Job Update

................................................................................

Function: IPR-Formulation

Company: Excipient company

Location: Mumbai

Positions: Executive/Sr. Executive

Experience: 2-4 years

Qualification: M pharmacy/Life sciences

Contact info: ketkip@idealcures.co.in

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Many thanks to my friend Mr Tushar Rane for sending this job update. If you know or have any vacancy in your IP department then you can contact me at: 
mahen_gunjal@yahoo.co.in 
WhatsApp: +91-7774007489

Tuesday, April 9, 2019

Ruxolitinib - USA


Decision on IPR: Apr 08, 2019

AIA Review
Filing Date
Institution Date
Petitioner
US Patent
Respondent
FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
IPR2017-01256
04/07/2017
04/09/2018
Incyte Corporation
9,249,149
Concert Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
 Claims 1–15 are unpatentable

US 9,249,149 (Concert Pharma.; Exp: Jun 14, 2033) – non OB

1. A compound of Formula A: ##STR00018## or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, wherein: Y.sup.1 is hydrogen; each Y.sup.2 is selected from hydrogen and deuterium, and each Y.sup.2 is the same; each Y.sup.3 is selected from hydrogen and deuterium, and each Y.sup.3 is the same; Y.sup.4 is selected from hydrogen and deuterium; each Y.sup.5 is the same and is selected from hydrogen and deuterium; and Y.sup.6, Y.sup.7, Y.sup.8 , Y.sup.9 and Y.sup.10 are each independently selected from hydrogen and deuterium; provided that: each Y.sup.2 is deuterium; or each Y.sup.3 is deuterium; or each Y.sup.2 and each Y.sup.3 is deuterium.

9. A compound of Formula I: ##STR00020## or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, wherein: Y.sup.1 is hydrogen; each Y.sup.2 is selected from hydrogen and deuterium, and each Y.sup.2 is the same; each Y.sup.3 is selected from hydrogen and deuterium, and each Y.sup.3 is the same; Y.sup.4 is selected from hydrogen and deuterium; each Y.sup.5 is the same and is selected from hydrogen and deuterium; and Y.sup.6, Y.sup.7 and Y.sup.8 are each independently selected from hydrogen and deuterium; provided that: each Y.sup.2 is deuterium; or each Y.sup.3 is deuterium; or each Y.sup.2 and each Y.sup.3 is deuterium.

The ’149 patent is entitled “Deuterated Derivatives of Ruxolitinib.”

PTAB in summary concluded that the challenged claims of the ’149 patent are unpatentable as obvious over Rodgers, Shilling, and the Concert Backgrounder. Specifically combined teachings of Rodgers, Shilling, and the Concert Backgrounder would have provided a person of ordinary skill in the art a reasonable expectation of successfully deuterating Rodgers’s ruxolitinib compounds at their metabolic “hot spots,” as identified by Shilling, and in the manner taught by the Concert Backgrounder. Person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from Shilling that Rodgers’s ruxolitinib compounds feature the metabolic “hot spots” targeted by the Concert Backgrounder for deuteration, and that the Concert Backgrounder teaches that such deuteration has the potential to improve the safety, tolerability, and efficacy of those compounds. PTAB also concluded that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation that the synthesized ruxolitinib analogs “may display” superior ADME properties, based upon the combined teachings of Shilling and the Concert Backgrounder.

Interestingly, Patent Owner argued that Petitioner has failed to carry its burden of proving that the “Concert Backgrounder” is a prior art printed publication. Patent Owner asserted that Petitioner has failed to meet its burden by relying “on a ‘cached WebCite® page’ to demonstrate public accessibility,” because “availability on the internet alone is not sufficient to show public accessibility.” Patent Owner asserted that Petitioner has not provided “evidence that WebCite® was catalogued or indexed such that POSAs would have been able to access the Concert Backgrounder on WebCite®, whether through search engine results or by a search of WebCite® itself.” Patent Owner further argued that Petitioner’s evidence establishes only that the Concert Backgrounder was available on WebCite® in 2009, and that the author of the law review article and the examiner who completed the International Search Report both “possessed the full WebCite address for the Concert Backgrounder.” With respect to the admissibility of “Concert Backgrounder”  as prior art PTAB determined that Petitioner’s evidence demonstrating publication of the Concert Backgrounder on the internet, along with the dissemination of the website to patent examiners and an author of a law review article directed to the subject matter of the reference, provides “a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Indeed, the Federal Circuit has recognized that “a published article with an express citation to the potentially invalidating reference would similarly provide the necessary guidance.”

Sunday, April 7, 2019

Job Update

.............................................................,..................

Function: IPR-Formulation

Company: United Phosphorus Ltd (UPL)

Location: Bandra, Mumbai

Positions: Manager

Experience: 7-9 years

Qualification: M pharmacy/Science

Contact info: Kiran Kurmi (022-49331541 )

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If you know or have any vacancy in your IP department then you can contact me at: 
mahen_gunjal@yahoo.co.in 
WhatsApp: +91-7774007489

Friday, April 5, 2019

Oxycodone – USA


On Apr 04, 2019, Federal Circuit affirmed (Rule 36 judgment) PTAB’s finding that only claim of oxycodone composition patent is obvious.

Purdue appealed the decision of PTAB from IPR2016-01027 & IPR2016-01028 which found claim 1 of    US 9,060,976 unpatentable. Claim 1 reads:

1. An extended release abuse deterrent dosage form comprising: a. a core matrix comprising a blended mixture of: (a) PEO having a molecular weight of from about 300,000 daltons to about 5,000,000 daltons; (b) magnesium stearate; and (c) oxycodone or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof; wherein the core matrix is heated to melt at least a portion of the PEO included in the core matrix during preparation of the dosage form; and b. PEG applied onto the core matrix; wherein the dosage form provides extended release of the drug.

Specifically, PTAB found claim 1 unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over McGinity, Joshi, and Palermo in IPR2016-01027 & over the combinations of a) Palermo, the Handbook, and McGinity; and b) McGinity, Joshi, Bastin, and PDR in IPR2016-01028.

In summary, PTAB held that McGinity itself teaches or suggests all the components required for the claimed formulation, with the exception of the requirement of that PEG is “applied onto the core matrix” as a coating. Insofar as McGinity fails to disclose the use of a coating, Palermo provides the motivation to apply a PEG coating onto the core matrix taught by McGinity by teaching that opioid dosage forms “may optionally be coated with one or more materials suitable for the regulation of release or for the protection of the formulation.” Moreover, although McGinity does not teach that the controlled-release formulation taught therein is abuse deterrent, it construed “abuse deterrent” in the preamble of claim 1 as merely a statement of intended use that is not entitled to patentable weight. Regardless, Joshi confirms that the PEO within the molecular weight range taught by McGinity can serve as a gelling agent that confers abuse deterrence.

Therefore, skilled artisan would have consulted prior art’s teachings in arriving at the claimed formulation.